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INTRODUCTION
The Sherman Antitrust Act § 2 makes monopolizing or attempting to
monopolize a particular trade or aspects of a trade a federal felony.'
More specifically, Section 2 of the Act addresses a firm's unilateral con-
duct.2 Under the administration of former President George W. Bush, a
* J.D. 2010, University of Michigan Law School; B.S. 2007, University of California
Los Angeles. The author would like to thank Teresa Lin and Reba Rabenstein for their helpful
comments and work on this Comment. Additional thanks to MTTLR Volume 16:2 staff for
their work on this Comment.
I. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2010).
2. JOHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS: A PRIMER 19
(4th ed. 2001 ).
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comprehensive guideline titled Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm
Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act ("Bush Guidelines") was
adopted in September of 2008 for enforcing Section 2 violations.' Under
President Barack Obama's administration, however, the enforcement of
antitrust laws is expected to undergo a radical transformation. On May
11, 2009, Christine A. Varney, the Assistant Attorney General for the
Department of Justice's Antitrust Division, announced that the Depart-
ment would withdraw the previous administration's guidelines for
antitrust enforcement, and take enforcement of antitrust abuses in a new
and more aggressive direction.!
Without the Bush Guidelines in place, the Department of Justice
("DOJ") has the freedom to pursue a more aggressive enforcement of
antitrust laws than before. Courts can no longer use the Bush Guidelines
for guidance or support for their holdings when interpreting Section 2
claims. The Obama administration's approach to antitrust enforcement
will likely have a strong impact on firms with a dominant market posi-
tion. Intel Corporation, the subject of recent concern for relatively
aggressive antitrust enforcement institutions, presents a good case in
point. In Europe, Intel was fined a record 1.06 billion euros, the equiva-
lent of 1.45 billion US dollars, by the European Union.6 The European
Commission found that Intel had broken European Union competition
laws through its abuse of dominance in the computer chip market, such
as attempting to exclude rivals like Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
("AMD") from the chip sales market.7 Domestically, Intel has been the
subject of two major ongoing antitrust lawsuits. 8 Arguably, Intel's busi-
ness practices might have been treated more leniently under the Bush
Guidelines.
Although Varney criticized the Bush Guidelines for its extremely
cautious approach in Section 2 enforcements,9 the Obama administration
has yet to produce clear guidelines as to the scope of its enforcement or
3. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report On Antitrust
Monopoly Law (May II, 2009) (on file with author), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr-
public/pressjreleases/2009/2457 10.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Christine Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Remarks before the Ctr. for Am. Progress, Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging
Era (May II, 2009) [hereinafter Varney Speech] (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/speeches/24571 I .htm).
6. James Kanter, Europe fines Intel $1.45 billion in Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES, May
13, 2009, http:llwww.nytimes.com/2009105/1 4lbusiness/globall I 4compete.html.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Complaint, New York v. Intel Corp., No. 09-CV-00827 (D. Del. Nov. 4,
2009) [hereinafter Intel N.Y Complaint]; In the Matter of Intel Corporation, FTC Dkt. No.
9341 (Dec. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Intel FTC Complaint].
9. Varney Speech, supra note 5.
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for how courts should interpret Section 2 claims. This Comment thus
proposes an approach to Section 2 enforcement and interpretation for the
Obama Administration through a closer adherence to Supreme Court
precedent. This Comment then compares and applies the proposed ap-
proach to Intel's particular case to illustrate the shift in antitrust
enforcement actions and how courts are likely to proceed.
Part I summarizes the Sherman Antitrust Act § 2 and the Bush
Guidelines for Section 2 enforcement. Part I1 discusses the antitrust
principles articulated by the Supreme Court in two seminal cases, Lorain
Journal v. United States, and Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Ski-
ing Co.,'° the limitations to Lorain and Aspen, and what these cases
mean for formulating new antitrust enforcement guidelines. Part III takes
Intel's case in point to analyze how such new guidelines may affect the
future of antitrust enforcement under the Obama Administration. Part III
compares the European Union's treatment of Intel to illustrate where the
United States' antitrust policy may be headed. Part III then applies and
compares the approach under the Bush Guidelines and the Obama Ad-
ministration's likely approach from Part II for a specific case analysis on
Intel and the personal computer microprocessor industry.
I. BACKGROUND OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAW
§ 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to mo-
nopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a fel-
ony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court."
The Sherman Antitrust Act was promulgated in 1890 and was de-
signed to prohibit "unreasonable" restraints on trade.'2 Section 2 of the
Sherman Act was intended specifically to prosecute any single-firm
10. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Aspen Skiing Co. v. As-
pen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
1I. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2008).
12. WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
UNITED STATES (3d ed., West 2002).
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conduct that constitutes the act of monopolizing.'13 There are two ele-
ments necessary in order to show the act of monopolizing. First, it must
be proved that the alleged monopolizing party had the possession of mo-
nopoly power in a relevant market.' 4 Second, there must be the "willful
acquisition or maintenance" of such power apart from the growth and
development due to "a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident."'"
The Bush Guidelines took a relatively narrow approach to finding
Section 2 violations. More specifically, three key features of the Bush
Guidelines illustrate its fairly cautious view towards enforcement of anti-
trust laws.'6 First, the Bush Guidelines placed an emphasis on the
negative effects of over-deterrence on the incentive structures which en-
courage innovation in a competitive market and the efficiency benefits of
competitive behavior.7 Many expert panelists involved with the devel-
opment of the Bush Guidelines, and even the Supreme Court itself, had
stressed the dangers from over-deterrence.'8 Second, in the absence of
conduct specific tests, the Bush Guidelines advocated the use of a dis-
proportionality test.'" Business conduct was found to be anticompetitive
under this test if it led to "harm to competition that is disproportionate to
consumer benefits .... 0 Third, the Bush Guidelines established a se-
ries of safe harbors which companies could follow to avoid being
prosecuted for Section 2 violations.2' Safe harbors were created by bright
line tests that determined the legality of particular conduct. For exam-
ple, in the two-pronged Brooke Group test for the particular conduct of
predatory pricing, a guilty defendant must have 1) priced below an ap-
propriate measure of cost, and 2) "'had a reasonable prospect, or .. . a
dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in below-costprices.',2Another example supported by the Bush Guidelines was a
market-share safe harbor for monopolies in Section 2 cases. Firms with
13. Chris Bernard, Note, Shifting and Shrinking Common Ground: Recalibrating the
Federal Trade Commission's and Department of Justice's Enforcement Powers of Single-Firm
Monopoly Conduct, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 581, 587-88 (2009).
14. U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966).
i5. Id. at 570-7 1.
16. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 3.
17. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 14 (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/23668l.pdf [hereinafter Bush Guidelines].
18. Id. at 14-15.
19. Id. at 45-46.
20. Id. at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id. at 17.
22. Id. at 18.
23. Id. at 18 (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 222, 224 (1993)).
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below fifty percent market share would not be considered to have mo-
nopoly power for Section 2 cases.2 4
In her May 11, 2009 speech before the American Center for Pro-
gress, Christine Varney withdrew the Bush Guidelines. 2' Her speech
signals a departure from the prior Department of Justice's defendant-
friendly approach to Section 2 enforcement. 6 First, she argued that the
Bush Guidelines reflected an "extreme hesitancy in the face of potential
abuses by monopoly firms"-it emphasized preserving efficiency at the
expense of "redressing exclusionary and predatory acts" that harm com-
petition, distort markets, and increase barriers to entry.27 Second, she
argued against the Bush Guideline's adoption of safe harbors to shield
specific types of business conduct from Section 2 enforcement as an un-
necessarily cautious approach to antitrust enforcement. 28 Third, Varney
repudiated the use of the disproportionality test to determine enforce-
ment of Section 2 for being an overly lenient approach to antitrust
enforcement which gave too much weight to the risk of over-
deterrence.29
While Varney has not set any new standards for the Obama admini-
stration's views on antitrust enforcement, she highlighted a series of
cases which may factor prominently in how the Department of Justice is
expected to approach antitrust violations. Two such cases are the Su-
preme Court's holdings in Lorain Journal v. United States3° and Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.3 These cases represent the
"tried and true standards which set forth clear limitations on how mo-
nopoly firms are permitted to behave."32 Thus, it seems likely that the
DOJ under the Obama Administration will rely on such Supreme Court
holdings to provide the broad guidelines for determining what consti-
tutes a monopolist's exclusionary or predatory conduct and whether they
are considered harmful to competition, and ultimately, to consumers.
The antitrust principles established in Lorain and Aspen also represent a
significant deviation from the approach to antitrust violations under the
Bush Guidelines.
24. Id. at 24.
25. Varney Speech, supra note 5.
26. Stephen Labaton, Obama Takes Tougher Antitrust Line, N.Y. TIMES, May I1, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.comI2009/05/12/business/economy/I 2antitrust.html.
27. Varney Speech, supra note 5.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
31. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
32. Varney Speech, supra note 5.
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II. LORAIN, ASPEN, AND LIMITATIONS
Together, Lorain and Aspen establish significant principles that may
serve as an important part of this present administration's guidelines for
Section 2 antitrust enforcement.
A. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States
In Lorain, the Court highlighted important points for enforcing Sec-
tion 2. First, it outlined the general rule that inducing others to boycott a
competitor is an unfair means of anticompetitive conduct. A local news-
paper publisher was found to have violated Section 2 by refusing to
advertise for local businesses who also advertised through a local radio
station. The defendant, The Lorain Journal Company, published a news-
paper, the Journal, in the City of Lorain, Ohio.' By 1933, the Journal
had a daily circulation of 13,000 in the city and reached 99% of the
city's families. The Court noted that between 1933 and 1948 the news-
paper publisher "enjoyed a substantial monopoly in Lorain of the mass
dissemination of news and advertising, both of a local and national char-
acter."" Using its advantageous position, the publisher then refused to
publish advertisements in the Journal from businesses who advertised,
or were suspected by the publisher to be interested in advertising, with
the local radio station (WEOL).36 Forced to choose, many Lorain County
businesses then stopped advertising with WEOL, and thereby reduced
WEOL's income." Because of the newspaper publisher's conduct, the
radio station's survival was then put in jeopardy."
Secondly, the case reaffirmed the principle that it is "unreasonable,
per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market. ' '3 In this
case, the newspaper and radio station operated through two different
forms of media. The Court, however, held that a Section 2 violation oc-
curred where "all the newspapers in a city, in order to monopolize the
dissemination of news and advertising by eliminating a competing radio
station, conspired to accept no advertisements from anyone who adver-
tised over that station., 40 Lorain was thus enjoined from refusing to
publish advertisements from businesses or individuals because they had
33. Lorain, 342 U.S. at 145.
34. Id. at 146.
35. Id. at 147.
36. Id. at 147-49.
37. Id. at 149.
38. Id. at 154.
39. Id. at 154 n.7 (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1948)).
40. Id. at 154.
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"proposed or proposes to advertise in or through any other advertising
medium."4'
B. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp
In Aspen, the Supreme Court affirmed the principle that a showing
of antitrust violation under Sherman Act Section 2 required two ele-
ments: 1) the possession of monopoly power in a relevant market, and 2)
the willful acquisition, maintenance, or use of that power by anticom-
petitive or exclusionary means or for anticompetitive or exclusionary
purposes." More importantly, commentators have argued that Aspen
supports that the second element could be shown by proving that the de-
fendant's conduct was "unreasonably exclusionary." The absence of a
legitimate business justification would strongly support a showing of
"unreasonably exclusionary" conduct." A monopolist firm's refusal to
deal with a competitor was deemed to violate Section 2 where it unnec-
essarily excludes or handicaps competitors and is not itself motivated by
41
valid business reasons.
In this case, the plaintiff, Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation
("Highlands"), owned the Aspen Highlands downhill skiing facility.4 6 In
addition to Highlands, there were three other downhill skiing facilities in
Aspen: Ajax, Buttermilk, and Snowmass.4 ' By 1967, defendant, Aspen
Skiing Company ("Ski Co."), owned the latter three. 48 An all-Aspen
ticket was used at all four ski facilities.4 9 This ticket was first introduced
in 1962 by the different owners of the ski resorts as a 6-day all-Aspen
ticket.5 0 In 1978, this ticket was discontinued after an agreement could
not be reached between Highlands and Ski Co." Ski Co. had demanded
Highlands accept a share of the revenue below its historic average based
on usage. 2 A member of Ski Co.'s board suggested making an offer that
Highlands would not be able to accept. 3 Thus, the Court affirmed the
lower courts' decisions that a firm with monopoly power over the Aspen
41. Id. at 157.
42. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595-96 (1985).
43. Robert Pitofsky, Some Predictions About Future Antitrust Enforcement, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 895, 897 (2009).
44. Id. at 897-98.
45. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 597.
46. Id. at 588.
47. Id. at 587-88.
48. Id. at 589.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 593.
52. Id. at 592.
53. Id.
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ski facility market violated Section 2 by refusing to participate in an all-
54Aspen ski pass unless its rival made significant financial concessions.
Furthermore, Ski Co.'s refusal to deal was not "justified by any normal
business purpose.""
In summarizing this case, Christine Varney noted in her speech that
Aspen stood "for the proposition that dominant firms can be expected to
deal with their rivals where cooperation is indispensable to effective
competition.5 6
In conjunction with each other, Lorain and Aspen lay down three
important principles for Section 2 enforcement. First, inducing third par-
ties to boycott a competitor is anticompetitive conduct in violation of
antitrust laws. Second, determining antitrust violations requires looking
at a monopolist's conduct not just in its own market but in other relevant
markets as well. Thus, a newspaper cannot attempt to foreclose competi-
tion from radio stations through anticompetitive means. Third, the
determination of what constitutes exclusionary conduct is influenced by
the presence or absence of valid business justifications. A broader theme
of the rulings in both cases is that the independent businessman's right to
refuse to deal with other firms is not unqualified. 7
C. Limitations to Lorain and Aspen
Two Supreme Court cases have had a substantial impact on poten-
tially limiting the reach of Aspen. First, in Verizon Communications, Inc.
v. Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, L.L.P., Justice Scalia wrote in his ma-
jority opinion for the Court that Aspen "is at or near the outer boundary
of Section 2 liability.' '"8 Justice Scalia conclusively stated that Section 2
does not give "judges carte blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its
way of doing business whenever some other approach might yield
greater competition.' 'SQ In this case, the respondent alleged that Verizon
hurt rival local exchange carriers ("LEC") from entering and competing
in the local telephone market by discriminatorily filing their orders for
access to operations support systems. 60 Justice Scalia distinguished this
case from Aspen by stating that Verizon's refusal to interconnect at cost
based rate of compensation is different from Ski Co.'s refusal to sell at
54. Id. at 611.
55. Id. at 608.
56. Varney Speech, supra note 5 (quoting Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Un-
ion Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 377-78 (7th Cir. 1986)).
57. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 601.
58. Verizon Commc'ns., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398,
409 (2004).
59. Id. at 415-16.
60. Id. at 405.
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retail price.' Verizon's refusal did not reflect "dreams of monopoly"
while the Aspen defendant's actions suggested that it believed its future
monopoly retail price would be higher.62 The majority concluded that this
case did not fit into the limited exception by Aspen and thus there was no
Sherman Act claim based on the set of facts presented."
Second, in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications,
the Supreme Court further limited the reach of Aspen in the context of a
vertically integrated firm in competition with non-vertically integrated
rival firms. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, found no
price-squeezing claim under Section 2.6 Plaintiffs, linkLine Communi-
cations, compete with defendant, AT&T, in the retail DSL market but
must lease DSL transport services from AT&T.61 It was argued that the
vertically integrated firm, AT&T, which has power in the wholesale mar-
ket, could squeeze competitors' profit margins by raising the wholesale
price of inputs sold to competitors and lowering the retail price of the
finished good. 6 Chief Justice Roberts noted that under the Sherman Act,
when a firm has no "duty to deal in the wholesale market[,]" it thus also
"has no obligation to deal under terms and conditions favorable to its
competitors. ' 7
D. Varney's Challenges to Formulating New Guidelines
Because of the holdings in Trinko and linkLine, Varney faces an up-
wards battle if she intends to resurrect the rulings from Lorain and Aspen
as the guiding principles for federal antitrust enforcement. Trinko and
linkLine directly limit the reach of Lorain or Aspen. Both the decisions
in Trinko and linkLine chip away against a broad interpretation of a
qualified refusal to deal. In Trinko, the Court argued that a refusal to deal
violated Section 2 only where defendant refused to sell at retail.68 In lin-
kLine, the Court rejected a price squeezing claim under Section 2 by
non-vertically integrated firms against a vertically integrated firm from
which the former bought inputs. Thus, to succeed in claims of Section 2
liability based on single-firm conduct, Varney must be able to show why
any of the cases she brings falls outside the legitimate bounds of conduct
protected by Trinko and linkLine.
61. Id. at 409.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 409-10, 415.
64. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns., Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1109, 1114-15 (2009).
65. Id. at 1115.
66. Id. at 1114.
67. Id. at 1119.
68. Bernard, supra note 13, at 590.
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Varney may be able to get around Trinko and linkLine by distin-
guishing between regulated and unregulated industries in bringing
antitrust enforcement actions. A decade of Supreme Court decisions have
created an environment where antitrust laws must defer to regulatory
decisions.69 Thus, one enforcement strategy she may pursue is to distin-
guish Trinko and linkLine on the basis that they only apply to cases
where there is already an existing regulatory framework to deal with an-
titrust problems. Varney mentions that these two cases may limit the
holding in Aspen where it involves "specific sectors subject to significant
and specialized regulatory overlay. ''7 Both cases, however, still reaffirm
Aspen's limits on single-firm predatory or exclusionary conduct.7' Her
argument is not without support. In Trinko, Justice Scalia highlights that
the structure and circumstances of the industry are important for any an-
titrust analysis.72 One such factor to consider would be the existing
presence of a regulatory structure "designed to deter and remedy anti-
competitive harm. ' 73 Antitrust enforcement would be superfluous where
such regulations exist and the benefit to further antitrust enforcement
would be small.74 In linkLine, the concurrence specifically notes that the
issue involved a regulated firm, and where a regulatory structure exists
to address anticompetitive concerns, the "cost of antitrust enforcement
are likely to be greater than the benefits. '5 Thus, the holdings in Trinko
and linkLine can be interpreted to limit the application of Aspen only
when the industry has a regulatory framework to deal with antitrust con-
cerns. In industries where anticompetitive behavior is not adequately
covered by regulators or regulations, there still exists an important role
for antitrust laws and the courts to play in enforcing Section 2 violations.
The argument that Trinko and linkLine only limit the reach of Aspen
on the right of refusal to deal in cases of regulated industries still has
some hurdles to overcome. The language in both cases implies that the
holdings may extend beyond antitrust actions involving only regulated
industries. In Trinko, the relevant regulatory framework, the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), contains an antitrust savings
clause stating "nothing in this Act ... shall be construed to modify, im-
69. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaining, 87
Tx. L. REv. 685, 685-86 (2009).
70. Varney Speech, supra note 5, at n.22.
71. Id.
72. Verizon Commc'ns., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Tinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398,
411-12(2004).
73. Id. at 412.
74. Id.
75. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1124 (2009) (Breyer,
J., concurring).
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pair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust laws.'76 This
savings clause "preserves those 'claims that satisfy existing antitrust
standards'," and thus the 1996 Act should not affect the reach of antitrust
laws." Yet, Justice Scalia also notes that in certain circumstances, "regu-
lation[s] significantly diminish[] the likelihood of major antitrust
harm." 8 In linkLine, the Court held that although the defendant had no
antitrust duty to deal with its rivals at the wholesale level under the
Sherman Act, the defendant may have such duties under FCC regula-
tions. 79 The Court, however, did not specifically address whether the
presence of FCC regulations diminished the need for Sherman Act anti-
trust enforcement or had no effect. The ambiguity of the two holdings
thus gives Varney some wiggle room to push for the DOJ to take an ag-
gressive approach towards antitrust enforcement. She could argue that
where there is no regulatory structure to address a particular market, a
more active antitrust regime guided by the antitrust laws and the courts is
necessary.
Another argument that Varney could make regarding the reach of
Trinko and linkLine is that the two cases are limited to situations where
the parties at issue are embarking upon a new business relationship as
opposed to discontinuing a prior relationship. In Aspen, Ski Co.'s deci-
sion to terminate the all-Aspen ticket was a decision by a monopolist "to
make an important change in the character of the market."0 The all-
Aspen ticket had been developed by the firms in a competitive market
and already used for several years.8' While not conclusive, this fact
weighed against finding that Ski Co.'s conduct was a legitimate right of
refusal to deal with a competitor. 2 On the other hand, Trinko and lin-
kLine, both more recent opinions by the Court, focus on whether an
entrenched firm has a duty to provide access to a particular facility to
new entrants to the market. Trinko involved the obligations by an incum-
bent LEC under the 1996 Act to share its network and unbundled
network elements with new entrants, the competitive LECs.83 Similarly,
linkLine involved an incumbent phone company's FCC obligation to sell
transmission service to independent DSL providers in order to grow
competition in the retail DSL market.84
76. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406 (quoting § 601 of the 1996 Act, 47 U.S.C. § 152, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 143 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. at 406.
78. Id. at 412 (quoting Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1990)).
79. linkLine, 129 S.Ct. at 1119.
80. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604 (1985).
81. Id. at 589.
82. Id. at 604.
83. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402.
84. linkLine, 129 U.S. at I115.
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III. CASE ILLUSTRATION: INTEL CORPORATION
Being the subject of recent antitrust concerns worldwide, Intel Cor-
poration provides a good illustration of how the Obama Administration
is likely to continue with Section 2 prosecutions.
A. Quick Look at the Personal Computer Microprocessor Industry
One industry that has been a subject of global antitrust concerns to-
day is personal computer microprocessors. Currently, this market is
dominated by two companies: Intel Corporation ("Intel") 85 and AMD.
Intel, by 2007, controlled about "four-fifths of the market for the central
processing units at the heart of the world's one billion personal com-
puters and servers .... AMD controls the remaining nineteen percent
of the market for personal computers central processing units. AMD's
nineteen percent share by March 2007 is a drop from its market share in
2006, which was twenty-five percent."9
B. The European Union Approach
The European Union has always been more active in bringing mo-
nopolization cases then the United States.9° The aggressive and proactive
sentiments in Varney's speech thus indicate that the DOJ is expected to
move towards a more European approach to antitrust enforcement."
Thus, before evaluating the current United States antitrust cases against
Intel, it may be useful to examine the European Commission's recent
finding that Intel had engaged in anticompetitive practices.
The European Commission decided on May 13, 2009 that Intel had
violated EC Treaty Article 82 and EEA Agreement Article 54 by "engag-
85. Intel was founded in 1968 by Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore and it is currently
headquartered in Santa Clara, California. The company produces an assortment of electronic
industry products including microprocessors and motherboards. Encyclopedia Britannica,
Intel Corporation, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/289747/lntel-Corporation (last
visited May 14, 2010).
86. AMD was founded in 1969 by Walter J. Sanders and several partners and is cur-
rently headquartered in Sunnyvale, California. The company makes microprocessors, flash
memories, and other components used in consumer electronic goods. Encyclopedia Britan-
nica, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD), http://www.britannica.comlEBchecked/topic/
1017522/Advanced-Micro-Devices-Inc (last visited May 14, 2010).
87. David Lawsky, Update 4-EU Says Intel Tried to Squeeze Out Advanced




90. Daniel A. Crane, Business Regulation: linkLine's Institutional Suspicions, 2009
CATO SUP. Cr. REV. I1I, 130.
91. Id. at 130.
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ing in a single and continuous infringement.., from October 2002 until
December 2007 by implementing a strategy aimed at foreclosing com-
petitors from the x86 CPU market. 92 Article 82 of the EC Treaty says
"any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade
between Member States."9 Intel was fined a record 1.06 billion euros. 94
Regulators ruled that Intel had broken European Union competition
laws in using its dominant market position to try to foreclose AMD from
the personal computer microprocessor market.95 Between 1997 and 2007,
Intel had a market share equal to or in excess of seventy percent.9 6 The
relevant product market was defined as that of the x86 CPUs and the
geographic market was worldwide.9 Intel was also found to have en-
gaged in anticompetitive practices. Intel "gave wholly or partially hidden
rebates to computer manufacturers on the condition that they bought all,
or almost all, of their x86 CPU's from Intel. '98 Intel also paid a major
retailer to stock only computers that used the Intel x86 CPU.99 Lastly,
Intel acted intentionally by making direct payments to computer manu-
facturers specifically to halt or delay the launch of products with x86
CPUs made by Intel's competitors, and to limit the sales of such prod-
ucts.' ° The European Union reached the conclusion that such practices
were an abuse of Intel's dominant market position and harmed consum-
101
ers.
92. Summary of Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 relating to a proceeding under
Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA agreement, Case COMP/C-3/37.990--
Intel, 2009 0.1. (C 227) 43 [hereinafter Summary of Commission Decision].
93. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 82.
Currently, EC Treaty Article 82 is Article 102 with the words 'common market' changed to
'internal market.' This is part of the revisions from the Lisbon Treaty which was entered into
force on December 1, 2009. Jacques Bourgeois et al., The Lisbon Treaty: The Next Steps For-
ward For Europe, WILMER HALE, L.L.P.-PuBL'NS, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.wilmerhale.
com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=9321. Because the decision was rendered in
May of 2009, I will refer to the provision as EC Treaty Article 82 to avoid any confusion.
94. Kanter, supra note 6.
95. Summary of Commission Decision, supra note 92, at 39.
96. Id. at 18.
97. Id. at 14-16.
98. Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Imposes a Fine of
E 1.06 bn on Intel for Abuse of Dominant Position; Orders Intel to Cease Illegal Practices,
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C. Obama Administration's Antitrust Approach
to Intel Corporation
In the United States, Intel has recently come under the radar of the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the New York Attorney General.
This section discusses in depth the FTC and New York Attorney General
antitrust lawsuits against Intel,' °2 and applies the principles from the Su-
preme Court precedent discussed earlier to gauge how the Obama
Administration will likely proceed with Section 2 claims.
In evaluating the Section 2 antitrust claims against Intel, two ele-
ments are necessary for finding whether an act of monopolizing has
occurred. First is the possession of monopoly power in a relevant mar-
ket."'" Second, is it a "willful acquisition or maintenance of that power"
that is distinguishable from typical growth related to a superior product,
good business judgments, or historical accidents. '°4
Lorain and Aspen provide strong legal principles for examining In-
tel's business practices in terms of the Section 2 and whether such
practices constitute an act of monopolizing. Both cases stand for the
proposition that there is not an unqualified right of refusal to deal with
others firm.' °  It is also important to examine if and how Trinko and lin-
kLine limitations should apply.'6 One argument to make against applying
the latter two cases is that both dealt with regulated industries."7 Intel's
CPU business is not within a regulated industry governed by a market
specific federal law or regulation such as telecommunications or high-
speed Internet service. Thus, Intel's conduct deserves a careful, full Sec-
tion 2 analysis for anticompetitive harm, since there is no need to defer
to an existing regulatory structure for its particular market.
102. The FTC suit, especially, may be an excellent indicator of what an aggressive anti-
trust enforcement strategy from the Obama Administration will look like. Because the two
agencies appear to be going in the same direction on antitrust enforcement, the FTC suit may
shed light on the DOJ's approach as well. Christine Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust
Div. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Vigorous
Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era (May 12, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.htm). Varney said she intended to "renew
enforcement collaboration between the Antitrust Division and the FTC". Id. Furthermore, she
expected to work on reaching greater consensus with the FTC especially with regard to single-
firm conduct and Section 2 enforcement. Id.
103. U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
104. Id. See also supra Part I.
105. Varney Speech, supra note 5. See also supra Part II.A-B.
106. See supra Part II.C-D.
107. Trinko involved whether a firm's duties under the 1996 Act states a claim under the
Sherman Act Section 2 as well. Verizon Commc'ns., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
540 U.S. 398, 401 (2004). linkLine involved FCC obligations for AT&T to provide DSL trans-
port services to independent DSL providers. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns Inc., 129
S. Ct. 1109, 1115(2009).
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1. Possession of Monopoly Power in a Relevant Market
In Aspen, Ski Co. possessed monopoly power where the relevant
product market was downhill ski facilities and the geographic submarket
was the Aspen area. ' Monopoly power was defined as "the power to
control prices in the relevant market or to exclude competitors."' ° Sig-
nificant evidence exists that Intel's control over the personal computer
microprocessor market reflects similar monopoly power as held by Ski
Co. in the Aspen case. This evidence is reflected in the two pending fed-
eral jurisdiction antitrust litigations against Intel.
In its complaint before the federal district court in New York v. Intel
Corporation, the New York Attorney General states, in reference to the
worldwide x86 CPU market, that an internal document from one of IN-
tel's customers concluded "in this market, Intel dictates the rules of the
game ... and most of their actions can be understood in the context of
keeping their distribution outlets (their customers) in line."" ° The FTC,
in its complaint, argues that Intel possessed monopoly power in the rele-
vant CPU markets with a unit share in the relevant markets since 1999 in
excess of seventy-five percent and a revenue share in excess of eighty
percent in the same time period."' The FTC defined the relevant product
market as CPUs used for desktop, notebook, net-book computers, serv-
ers, and narrower relevant markets within this group. ' 2 Within CPUs, the
x86 microprocessor is the industry standard for personal computers and
servers."' Non-x86 microprocessors thus do not significantly restrain
Intel's monopoly power."'4 The relevant geographic market is world-
wide. "' Furthermore, the FTC points out that there are significant
barriers to entry into the market including product development, the cost
and expertise to develop manufacturing capabilities, intellectual property
rights, establishment of product reputation and compatibility, and Intel's
"unfair methods of competition and efforts to maintain or obtain a mo-
nopoly position in the markets."" 
6
108. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n.20 (1985).
109. Id.
110. Intel N. Y Complaint, supra note 8, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted) (par-
enthetical in original).
Ill. Intel FTC Compaint, supra note 8, at 13.
112. Id. at132.
113. Id. at 35.
114. Id. at 36.
115. Id. at 40.
116. Id. at 42.
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2. Willful Acquisition, Maintenance, or Use of That Power
Both Lorain and Aspen stand for the principle there is not an un-
qualified right to refuse to deal with other firms."7 This holding also
stood for two broader implications. First, the Court noted that this was
part of broader principle where "[in the absence of any purpose to cre-
ate or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized
right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal.""' 8 Second, the Court noted that that the right to re-
fuse to deal with other firms would be characterized as exclusionary
depending on the impact on consumers, whether it impaired competition
in an unnecessarily restrictive way, and whether there were valid busi-
ness reasons." 9 Thus the cases establish a basic standard for judging
what constitutes exclusionary conduct.
Under this standard, Intel Corp.'s business practices should come
under increased scrutiny for antitrust enforcement. In its complaint, the
New York Attorney General argues that several of Intel's practices con-
stitute exclusionary conduct. Intel had an agreement with Dell from
2001 to 2006 where Intel paid Dell billions of dollars, gave it a preferred
supply of chips over its competitors, and worked with Dell to submit
below-cost bids in competition with AMD products.'2 Despite the fact
that Dell recognized AMD's superiority in chip design and suffered mar-
ket loss during this time period, it did not end its agreement with Intel
until 2006. 21 Intel had a similar relationship with Hewlett-Packard
("HP"). HP sold some AMD-based products but refused to expand its
relationship with AMD due to pressure from Intel-Intel offered pay-
ments, threatened to cancel payments and joint ventures. 22 Intel's
relationship with IBM reflected a similar effort on the part of Intel to
foreclose the latter from expanding its number of AMD products. Intel
also threatened to cut subsidies, end joint projects, and offered additional
payments to IBM to not launch or limit the purchase of AMD products.,
23
Such practices by Intel Corp should come under scrutiny for viola-
tion of Section 2 for two reasons. First, based on Lorain, a firm is
prohibited from inducing customers to boycott its competitor. In Aspen,
117. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985).
118. Id. at 602 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
119. Id. at 605.
120. Intel N. Y Complaint, supra note 8, at 1 40, 79, 82.
121. Id. at 176.
122. Id. at 149. In one example, in 2002, HP imposed a five percent cap on the number
of its AMD-based commercial desktop PCs in exchange for $130 million in rebate payments
from Intel. Id. at 150.
123. Id. at 202.
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the Court further held that a firm's right to dealing with other firms or
customers is not unqualified. Here, Intel conditioned payments, rebates,
and subsidies to Dell, HP, and IBM on the condition that these compa-
nies either not offer AMD products or limit the number of AMD
products that they would offer. For example, Intel tied a payment to HP
in exchange for HP capping the number of its AMD based desktops to
five percent.'2 4 This is similar to both Lorain and Aspen where the Court
ruled against a monopolist who dealt with its customers in a manner that
was harmful to its competitor. Second, in evaluating exclusionary con-
duct, one must look at the effect of the conduct on the firm itself,
consumers, and competitors. "2The Attorney General complaint notes
that Intel's practices have led to higher prices for consumers,' 26 and de-
creased innovation through limiting the availability of choices between
competing technologies to businesses and consumers. 27 Intel's practices
have affected AMD's ability to expand the market for its products among
original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") such as Dell, HP, and
IBM.'
28
Additionally, Aspen suggests that the lack of a business justification
would weigh strongly towards a finding of unreasonably exclusionary
conduct. The Attorney General complaint argues that Intel offered bribes
or coerced OEMs to not offer, or otherwise limit the offering of, AMD
CPU products. 29 Its actions were not based on legitimate marketing
strategies for its own products but rather efforts to limit AMD's ability to
gain sales.'"" Furthermore, in its partnership with Dell, Intel satisfied one
hundred percent of Dell's demand even at the expense of being unable to
satisfy the demand of other OEMs. 3 1 In another example, of all compa-
rable OEMs, only Dell's rebates were based on its percentage of total
CPU purchases from Intel.'32 Internal Dell emails among its executives
pointed out that the rebates were incentives "to help AMD get weaker."'
133
Such evidence shows that Intel's payments to Dell were not pro-
competitive acts but rather to keep AMD at bay.'" 4
124. Id. at 150
125. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985).
126. Intel N. Y Complaint, supra note 8, at 1 67.
127. Id. at 11 70-71.
128. Id. at ll 1-2.
129. Id. at 140.
130. Id. at 142.
131. Id. at 79.
132. Id. atc 81.
133. Id. at l 82.
134. Id. at 81.
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D. Applying the Bush Guidelines to Intel
It is worthwhile, for comparative reasons, to consider what would
have happened if the Department of Justice had pursued the Intel case
under the withdrawn Bush Guidelines.
The first step in a Section 2 case is to show that the defendant had
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market. The Bush
Guidelines state that monopoly power is shown by the possession of a
high share of the relevant market and the presence of entry barriers."5
There is a rebuttable presumption that a firm possesses monopoly power
when it has a share of the market greater than two thirds for a significant
period and its market share is unlikely to be eroded in the near future.'36
For Intel, the FTC argues that Intel possessed monopoly power in the
relevant CPU markets with a unit share in the relevant markets since
1999 in excess of seventy-five percent and a revenue share in excess of
eighty percent in the same time period.'37 The FTC complaint also noted
several barriers to entry into the market, making new entry unlikely.'38
The second step in a Section 2 analysis is to show the willful acqui-
sition or maintenance of that power.' 39 Under the Bush Guidelines, a key
issue to look at is the Guideline's position on single-product loyalty dis-
counts. Single-product loyalty discounts include discounts or rebates a
seller offers to a buyer(s) on units of a single product conditioned on the
level of purchases. 4" This is akin to Intel, which offered rebates and dis-
counts to several computer manufacturers depending on how many units
of Intel x86 CPU's they bought. For single-product loyalty discounts, the
Bush Guidelines favor the standard predatory-pricing approach.' 4' In re-
gards to this approach, the Bush Guidelines cite Professor Hovenkamp's
"antitrust's ordinary predatory pricing rule" where the discount is "law-
ful if the price [on all units sold] after all discounts are taken into
account exceeds the defendant's marginal cost or average variable
cost.' 42 The DOJ under the Bush Administration favored this approach
because of its ease of administration and enforcement by courts, clarity
for businesses, and low risk of chilling desirable and procompetitive
price competition benefiting consumers. ' 3 The Bush Guidelines clearly
135. Bush Guidelines, supra note 17, at 2 1.
136. Id. at 30.
137. Intel FTC Complaint, supra note 8, at 1 2.
138. Id. at 3.
139. U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
140. Bush Guidelines, supra note 17, at 106.
141. Id. at 116.
142. Id. at I I I (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
9 749b (2d ed. 2002)).
143. Id. at 116.
Spring 20101 Lorain, Aspen, and the Future of Section 2 Enforcement 437
support that a standard predatory pricing test would work for most cases
involving single-product loyalty discounts."
Applying the Bush Guidelines predatory pricing approach, Intel
could not have violated Section 2. The Hovenkamp method, described in
the Bush Guidelines, compares the price of the post-discounted units to
the marginal cost or average variable cost for determining whether there
was below cost pricing.' 41 On the other hand, the FTC complaint's claim
that the volume discounts on CPU purchases are effectively below cost
are based on a comparison with the sum of average variable cost and an
appropriate level of contribution towards sunk costs. 4 6 The New York
Attorney General's complaint does not mention specifically whether In-
tel's sales of x86 CPUs to the computer manufacturers was below cost. It
only notes that Intel supported Dell in the latter's below cost bids to en-
terprise customers in competition with AMD based computers and
servers.' 7 Thus, the arguments made in the FTC and New York Attorney
General Complaints may not be enough to support a finding of below
cost pricing under the test articulated for analyzing whether a single-
product loyalty discount is anticompetitive in the Bush Section 2 Guide-
lines.
CONCLUSION
The Department of Justice's withdrawal of the Bush Guidelines will
mark a significant shift in the type of Section 2 cases brought by the
DOJ and the FTC. Christine Varney's speech seems to signal a less sym-
pathetic view of single-firm conduct than the prior administration.
However, whether courts will follow her lead remains to be seen. Courts
have looked to DOJ guidelines before to support their holdings even
though they are not bound by them. Because of the withdrawal of the
guidelines, courts can no longer cite the Bush Guidelines for support.
In formulating its new guidelines for antitrust enforcement, the DOJ
should consider significantly the implications of Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States and Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
Together these two cases could serve to help the DOJ develop strong,
clear, and consistent standards for Section 2 enforcement. This Comment
144. Id. However, even the Guidelines themselves note that some scholars believe this
approach would fail to identify certain harmful foreclosures. For example, the discount might
be structured to induce the customer to buy all or almost all of its needs from the monopolist.
It could also be used to "deny a monopolist's rivals the scale necessary to enter or remain in a
market." Id. at 114.
145. Id. at I 11.
146. Intel FTC Complaint, supra note 8, at 153.
147. Intel N. Y Complaint, supra note 8, at 74.
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supports one such approach for the current Administration: First, a firm
does not have an unqualified right to deal or not with other firms. For
example, one cannot induce third parties to boycott a competitor. Sec-
ond, in evaluating anticompetitive exclusionary conduct there are three
important factors to look at the impact of the action on consumers, com-
petition, and the presence of valid business justifications. While the
Trinko and linkLine holdings limit the application of Lorain and Aspen,
they can be distinguished from implying any broad repudiation of Lorain
and Aspen. Furthermore, Trinko and linkLine continue to reflect the Su-
preme Court's concern over excessive antitrust enforcement, including
Section 2. In conclusion, careful consideration of all four rulings for fu-
ture antitrust enforcement should help produce greater competition and
benefit for consumers in all industries. Furthermore, the long-standing
principles from these cases may have a substantial antitrust role to play
especially in evaluating and safeguarding against the dangers from sin-
gle-firm conduct and abuse of dominance.
